This paper examines the impacts of M&A advisor's industry expertise on firm's choice of financial advisors in mergers and acquisitions. We show that an investment bank's industry expertise increases its likelihood of being chosen as an advisor, especially in horizontal mergers, when the acquisition is more complex, and when firms have less prior acquisition experience. However, due to the concerns about information leakage to industry rivals through M&A advisors, acquirers are reluctant to share advisors with rival firms in the same industry, and they are more likely to switch to new advisors if their former advisors have advisory relationship with their industry rivals. In addition, we document that advisors with more industry expertise earn higher advisory fees and increase the likelihood of deal completion.
I. Introduction
A major source of revenue for investment banks comes from the provision of corporate mergers and acquisition advisory services.
1 According to Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) , financial advisors were involved in global merger transactions worth around $4.2 trillion in 2007
(representing more than 85% of all transactions by value) and the provision of these services earned the investment banks advisory fees of about $40 billion. Given the economic magnitude and rapidly evolving nature of merger advisory business, there has been an increasing effort by academic researchers to identify the key driving forces behind the advisor-firm relationship.
Among others, financial advisor reputation, acquirer experience, deal complexity, and target business structure have been shown by prior studies to be the important concerns for firms when choosing financial advisors.
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In this paper, we examine the economic causes and implications of choosing merger advisors. In particular, we focus on the aspects that have been largely underexplored in empirical work -namely advisor's industry expertise and firm's concerns about information leakage to product-market rivals through M&A advisors.
In M&As, investment banks advise acquiring and target firms by evaluating the assets of target firms and providing technical and tactical assistance throughout the takeover process (Bodnaruk, Massa, and Simonov (2009) ). Through repeated participation in M&A transactions in a certain industry, advisors can accumulate industry-specific merger expertise that enable them to better assess firm value and synergies, execute complex deals, and reduce transaction costs.
Moreover, by advising different firms in an industry and employing experienced industry analysts, advisors can become privy to crucial legal and regulatory issues, important industry 1 Throughout the paper, we use the terms mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, and M&A interchangeably. We also use the terms advisor, financial advisor, bank, and investment bank interchangeably. 2 See among others, Servaes and Zenner (1996) , Rau (2000) , and Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) . developments, and firm-level information, so that they can leverage their domain expertise to provide tailored advisory service for firms in a particular industry. When choosing from amongst the candidate banks, firms in M&As may therefore also attach importance to a bank's expertise in industries that are of interest to it. Although Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) have documented some causal evidence that banks use their industry expertise to develop unique underwriting capacity in certain industries, the effects of bank's industry expertise on the advisor choice and merger outcomes have largely remained unexplored.
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On the other hand, advisor's industry expertise may also heighten firms' concerns about leakage of sensitive information to industry (product-market) rivals. 4 A firm's strategically sensitive information (e.g. operational efficiency, customer/supplier relationships, progress on research and development projects etc.) is amongst its most valuable intangible assets. Through due diligence undertaken before the execution of a deal, and certification of information process for investors when selling securities, investment banks gain access to this sensitive information.
This firm-specific information is valuable to a product-market rival and may inhibit sharing of advisors between firms in an industry. In general, large firms who have bigger market shares and can affect the market equilibrium are more sensitive to the effects of information leakage than small firms (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) ). Therefore, they should be more willing to protect private information and inhibit its leakage to rival firms through M&A advisors. In addition, the concerns about information leakage to industry rivals may also vary between acquirers and targets. Target firms normally cease to exist as standalone companies if the mergers succeed, whilst acquiring firms continue competing against their rivals in product markets. This implies 3 For instance, in context of IPOs, Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2002) find that, of the 15 IPOs completed between 1990 and 1994 in the trucking industry, 9 were lead managed by one bank (Alex. Brown) , suggesting that bank's industry expertise influences the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates. 4 See Rajan and Zingales (2001) , and Zabojnik (2002) , and Baccara and Razin (2004) for analyses of information leakage concern in situations in which the crucial information is leaked outside the firm through its employees or former employees.
that other things being equal, acquirers should have stronger concerns of information leakage than target firms when selecting M&A advisors.
Taken together, we conjecture that a bank's industry expertise has both positive and negative effects on firm's choice of M&A advisors. On one hand, a bank's strong industry expertise can enable it to efficiently collect and process information in the industry, effectively facilitate deals, reduce transaction costs, and develop unique capacity in the industry. On the other hand, its potential clients may be concerned about the likelihood of it (the bank) leaking sensitive information to product market rivals. As a result, firms in M&As may trade off advisor's industry expertise garnered from dealing with industry peers against the chance that the advisor may leak sensitive information to their product-market competitors.
Against this background, we examine how investment banks are chosen as merger financial advisors for a sample of 12,996 mergers announced between 1985 and 2008. We utilize the frameworks developed in Wilhelm (2006, 2009) and Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) to examine jointly the effects of bank's industry merger expertise and firm's concern about information leakage on the likelihood of a particular advisor being chosen for a transaction, while controlling for prior bank-firm relationships, bank's market share and other deal characteristics. Our empirical models examine the advisor choices of both acquirers and targets. This setup recognizes that although all firms involved in a merger may consider similar factors in choosing an advisor, the influence of these factors may be different for acquirers and targets.
Our results show that industry expertise -when measured as prior merger advisory experience for all firms in the industry -is a strong determinant of advisor choice by all firms. In addition, we find that the impact of industry expertise on advisor choice is contingent on the nature of deal provisions. Specifically, bank's industry merger expertise becomes even more important for advisor choice in horizontal mergers, when firms have less prior acquisition experience, and in complicated transactions, which include pure-stock mergers, mergers of equals, and mergers with termination fee provisions. Furthermore, consistent with our prediction that firms may avoid sharing investment banks with major product-market rivals, a bank is less likely to be chosen by the acquirer (target) if it has had a relationship with the acquirer's (target's) major product-market rivals.
To further investigate the influence of concerns about information leakage to productmarket rivals, we study the advisor switching behaviour (if any) in consecutive M&A transactions for both acquirers and targets. Our results indicate that acquirers and targets exhibit different switching behaviours -acquirers are more likely to switch advisors due to concerns about information leakage to product-market rivals, whereas targets' switching decisions are unaffected. The propensity to switch advisors is however mitigated -for acquirers only -by past advisor's industry expertise.
We then examine whether advisors' industry expertise affects the price and quality of their advisory services. We find that both acquirers' and targets' advisory fees are positively related to the bank's industry expertise, implying that firms pay premium fees for superior services provided by advisors based on their industry experiences. Do advisors with stronger industry expertise charge higher fees because they provide higher-quality services? To answer this question, we study the impact of advisor's industry expertise on various merger outcomes.
To the extent that advisor's industry expertise enhances advisor's ability to structure mergers with higher synergies or improve advisor's bargaining expertise in acquisition negotiations, industry expertise should be positively related to values for shareholders in firms hiring the advisor. Furthermore, if advisors with rich industry merger experience are hired by firms to facilitate and complete the deal, advisor's industry expertise should be positively related to the likelihood of deal completion.
We find no evidence that advisor's industry expertise affects shareholders' value in acquiring and target firms, in terms of cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement date of acquisitions, the synergy gains, and the acquirer's post-merger stock returns. However, we find that acquirer's advisors with stronger industry expertise are more likely to complete the transactions they handle. These results are consistent with Rau (2000) who
shows that deal valuation is of secondary importance for advisors because they generally have strong deal completion incentives and their role is simply to complete the deal. Finally we note that banks may also develop both relationships with firms and industry expertise through securities underwriting, among others. We note that all our results remain unchanged when we concurrently include variables that measure a bank's industry expertise, bank-industry rival relationship, and bank-firm prior relationship on the basis of past provision of underwriting services.
Our contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we identify advisor' industry-specific merger experience and firm's concern about information leakage to industry rivals as new factors influencing the advisor choice in mergers and acquisitions. In addition, we show that the impact of industry expertise on advisor choice is contingent on deal characteristics and deal complexity.
Second, consistent with Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) who demonstrate that firms are reluctant to share underwriters in debt and equity issuances to avoid information leakage to product-market rivals, our results suggest that in the context of M&As, merger parties, particularly acquirers, avoid sharing financial advisors with their product-market rivals. This finding sheds light on how investment banks compete for M&A advisory services. Third, we show that merger parties are willing to pay higher fees for banks with stronger industry expertise, indicating that it makes economic sense for investment banks to build up and protect their industry expertise. In return for premium fees, advisors with industry merger expertise increase the likelihood of deal completion.
Our work is related to several papers studying how M&A expertise or experience affects M&A outcomes. Mkrtchyan (2012) shows that directors' past acquisition experience is associated with higher announcement returns. Bao and Edmans (2011) identify a significant investment-bank fixed effect in M&A returns and show that advisor's past performance affects M&A outcomes. Ertugrul and Krishnan (2011) study the relation between individual investment bankers and acquisition outcomes. Lastly, Song, Wei, and Zhou (2013) document that the expertise of boutique advisors benefits acquirer's shareholders. In this paper we focus on advisor's merger expertise developed in an industry and examine whether it affects firm's choice of advisor and merger outcomes.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section II briefly reviews the relevant literature and develops our hypotheses. Section III describes our sample, variable construction, and the empirical methodologies. Main results and robustness checks are presented in Section IV.
Section V concludes.
II. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development
A. Industry Expertise, Information Leakage to Product-Market Rivals and the Choice of
Financial Advisor
Financial advisors are thought to perform at least two important functions during a takeover (McLaughlin (1990 (McLaughlin ( ), (1992 ). First, they help their clients in identifying better mergers -mergers that are expected to result in high synergies, and hence create higher value for the firms involved. A related function is to also propose mechanisms that allow the realization of these synergies once the merger is consummated. Second, financial advisors advise clients on strategic actions that may relate to the bid itself (designing the actual offer, bidding strategies etc.), and on actions to counteract any moves undertaken by merger counterparties and productmarket competitors. By assisting different firms in an industry for M&As, advisors can build industry-specific merger expertise and develop unique advisory capacity in the industry.
Additionally, advisors specializing in a certain industry may achieve information advantage through past transactions and the research performed by experienced industry analysts (Kadan et al. (2012) ). Collectively, advisor's industry expertise should enhance advisor's ability to value firms in acquisitions, lower the transaction costs, and improve advisor's skill in executing the transaction. We thus conjecture that all else equal, the ability of financial advisors to perform these functions depends on their prior experience in an industry or product-market that is of interest (to the acquirer and the target). Consequently, industry expertise may increase the likelihood of a financial advisor being chosen to advise on an acquisition involving firms in the said industry.
The demand for industry expertise may vary across different types of transactions. For instance, the acquirer may not care much about industry expertise if the target is relatively small.
On the other hand, the acquirer may value industry expertise more if the transaction is perceived to be more complex or the target is difficult to value. We therefore expect that the effect of industry expertise on advisor choice to be contingent on both the nature of deal provisions and the complexity of the transaction, such as industry relatedness between acquirer and target, the method of payment, the relative size of acquirer and target, and the risk management devices used in acquisitions. In particular, we expect the effect of industry expertise to be stronger in horizontal mergers where advisors' industry expertise is more relevant for the valuation of target firms. Additionally, industry expertise is expected to be important in pure-stock mergers in which the targets are difficult to value (Hansen, 1987) , in mergers-of-equals in which the targets are comparable with the acquirers in size, and in mergers where termination fees are set to resolve contracting problems between the acquirer and the target (Officer, 2003) .
Industry expertise inevitably comes with the potential threat of leaking sensitive firmspecific information to outsiders. It is reasonable to assume that such information is most useful to a firm's direct competitors and that the likelihood of such leakage increases after the firm-bank relationship is terminated. Further, the threat of leakage exists in both directions -the advisor may leak information about its other clients (who are the source of its industry expertise) to the new client or it may leak new client-related information to other firms. 5 Asker and Ljungqvist . Specifically, they show that firm's concerns about informational frictions make them reluctant to share a bank with major product-market rivals and that these issues pose an endogenous limit on banks' market power.
Arguably, concerns regarding information leakage may be even more pronounced around a merger as the bank simultaneously manages multiple facets of the transaction such as raising the necessary capital, negotiating buyer, supplier, and employee relationships, and implementing integration strategies. Under such circumstances the "loss" due to information leakage may indeed be quite large. We therefore propose that concerns regarding information leakage may also exert significant influence on how financial advisors are chosen by the parties in a merger transaction.
The preceding discussion suggests that the likelihood of an investment bank winning the merger advisory mandate may be positively influenced by its industry-specific experience but negatively influenced by its current clients' desire to inhibit information leakage to their productmarket competitors. The significance of the information flow depends on the position of the firm in the industry. In general, leading large firms in an industry are expected to be more concerned about information leakage than smaller firms because they have more strategic options that are vulnerable to information leakage (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) ). We thus expect acquirers to be more concerned with information leakage than targets because acquirers are generally much larger than targets and because typically, on completion of the deals, targets may cease to exist.
In the same vein, compared with target firms, acquirers are expected to be more likely to switch 
B. The Effects of Industry Expertise on the Price and Quality of Advisory Services
M&A advisory fees serve as a major source of revenue for investment banks (Kolasinski and Kothari 2008) , it thus is interesting to investigate whether advisor's industry expertise is rewarded by a higher price of their services in M&As. The impact of bank's industry expertise on advisory fees is unclear ex ante. One may expect that a bank's industry expertise may allow it to command a higher fee from the merging firms for performing superior services. On the other hand, industry experience may be associated with a lower advisory fee as the expertise (achieved through past transactions) may lower advisors' costs of information production. It is thus an empirical question to assess which view is more relevant.
We investigate two main views on the effects of advisor's industry expertise on the quality of advisory services. Advisors with industry merger expertise could be able to create higher synergies by identifying firms with better matches. We refer to this possibility as the "value enhancement" view. This view predicts that advisor's rich industry expertise results in value-enhancing deals for firms. For example, firms advised by banks with stronger industry expertise should engage in mergers with higher synergies and better post-merger performance, and earn higher announcement-period excess returns.
On the other hand, more experienced advisors could be hired simply to complete M&A transactions without incurring any material value effects on shareholders. We term this as the "deal completion" view. This view predicts that advisor's industry expertise should be positively associated with the likelihood of deal completion, but should not be significantly related to shareholder value in acquisitions. This view is also examined by Rau (2000) who finds that investment banks focus on completing the deal, rather than enhancing value for shareholders of firms hiring them in acquisitions.
III. Data and Variables

A. Sample and Data
We begin by outlining the steps followed to construct the set of candidate advisors (banks) used in the study. We collect the advisor information from SDC/Platinum and select sample banks by forming a union of two groups of banks: (1) the sample of Ljungqvist, Marston, and
Wilhelm (2006); and (2) the sample of 50 most active banks in M&A activities by transaction value over the period January 1985 to December 2008. As SDC/Platinum sometimes reports multiple codes for the same bank, we manually check these codes and combine them into a single code if they belong to the same bank. To account for major bank mergers during the study period,
we utilize the data provided in Corwin and Schultz (2005) and Ljungqvist, Marston and Wilhelm (2006) , and the data supplemented by SDC/Platinum and other financial news sources. Appendix
A lists the final set of survival banks, together with their predecessors, during the sample period.
The number of candidate banks varies from 57 to 107 over time, depending on past mergers and the date a bank first appears in SDC Mergers and Acquisitions.
Our primary merger sample obtained from SDC M&A database includes mergers and acquisitions between U.S. firms between January 1985 and December 2008. We only include deals that are either completed or withdrawn, and we exclude "buybacks", "exchange offers", and "recapitalizations" as indicated by the SDC, and privatizations in which acquirers and targets have the same CUSIP. We require both the acquirer and target have available SIC codes and require that acquirers own less than 50% of targets' shares before the announcement date and controls 100% of targets' shares after acquisition. We exclude deals that are worth less than $1 million or less than 1% of the acquiring firm's market value of equity. Also excluded are transactions with no deal value disclosed. Finally, we eliminate deals in which neither the acquirer nor the target appoints an advisor in appendix A. Our final sample consists of 12,996 mergers and acquisitions. Financial data is obtained from Compustat Industrial Annual database. [Insert Table 1 here] Table 2 reports the summary statistics for market shares of the twenty five most active financial advisors in our sample. We rank them based on the total value of all transactions (column 1) advised by the surviving bank and its predecessors. Column (3) Table 2 here]
B. Variables
Bank's industry expertise. As the key variable of our interest, bank's industry expertise is set equal to the number of mergers advised by a bank for a firm's four-digit SIC industry divided 6 Note that the ranking reported in Table 2 may be different from that given by the SDC league tables because when calculating the number of deals advised by an advisor, we include all deals advised by the bank and its predecessors. In addition, the top eight investment banks are slightly different from those of Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) . Lazard and UBS rank number 8 and 9 in their Table I , but rank number 9 and 8, respectively, in our sample. The discrepancy is caused by the difference in sample period between theirs (1996-2009) and ours .
by the total number of mergers in the industry during the past five years. This definition is similar to that of Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) . By construction, it takes a value between zero and one. If there were no mergers in the industry over the past five years, all banks are assigned a value zero for industry expertise.
Bank-industry rival relationship.
To capture the concern of information leakage to industry rivals, we follow Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) and construct a bank-industry rival relationship variable, which is defined as the number of deals advised by a bank for largest three firms in the firm's four-digit SIC industry (excluding the firm itself if it is among top three)
divided by the total number of advised deals in the firm's industry during the past 5 years. The three largest firms are defined using net sales in Compustat in the calendar year of the merger announcement. By definition, this variable is positively related to the measure of industry expertise defined above since both variables are based on banks' advisory experiences with firms in the same industry. Untabulated results show that the correlation coefficients between the bank-industry rival relationship and industry expertise is 0.37 for acquirers and 0.36 for targets, both significant at the 1% level. However, the bank-industry rival relationship variable is designed to capture the specific industry experience garnered from dealing with the firm's major industry rivals. M&As. We define a bank's market share as the fraction of total transactions that have been advised by the candidate bank in the previous calendar year. 8 Second, a bank is unlikely to advise a merger whereby the transaction value is either unusually large or unusually small relative to its average deal size over the sample period. 9 Therefore, we use the variable, Relative
Transaction Size, to capture the absolute difference between the current transaction value and the average transaction value advised by a bank during the past five years. Finally, a larger transaction is more likely to involve advisors (Servaes and Zenner (1996) ). To capture this effect we include Ln(Transaction Size) which is the natural logarithm of the transaction value recorded by SDC.
8 More specifically, a bank's market share in mergers is defined as the number of mergers advised by the bank divided by the total number of mergers in previous calendar year. Similar results are obtained if we define market share using the transaction values rather than the number of transactions. We define a bank's market share over one year instead of five years following Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003) who use market share defined over a short period (1-year) to predict the advisor choice. 9 Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) make a similar argument in their analysis of underwriter choices in securities offerings.
IV. Results
A. Probit Models for the Advisor Choice
Our empirical model of advisor choice is similar to underwriter choice models employed by Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2006) . Each firm's (acquirer or target) decision is modelled as choosing an advisor from amongst all possible competing banks, whereby the choice is influenced by variables of interest such as industry expertise, bank-industry rival relationship, among others. To be more specific, each firm k (acquirer or target) is modelled as having a utility function as follows.
,
where Y kjt is a set of bank-specific variables of interest, including industry expertise and bankindustry rival relationship. X kjt is a vector of other determinants of advisor choice. ε kjt is the normally distributed error term that captures transaction-specific idiosyncratic shocks at time t.
Given this utility function, each firm chooses the advisor that maximizes its utility. The probability that a bank j advises a firm k at time t is modelled in a probit setting as,
where f is the cumulative normal distribution function, and the dependent variable takes a value of one if a bank is chosen to advise the acquirer (or the target) of a particular M&A deal, zero otherwise. 10 For each transaction, we include in the choice set all available advisors and create all possible pairs for each firm (acquirer or target) and advisors, resulting in 578,190 acquireradvisor pairs and 746,113 target-advisor pairs.
[Insert Table 3 here] 10 A potential problem of using a probit model for advisor choice is that the unconditional probability of being selected as a financial advisor of a merger is low (around 1%). In other words, being selected is a rare event. King and Zeng (2001) argue that the use of traditional binary choices models will underestimate the probability of rare events. To correct for the bias, we use the rare event Logistic Regression developed by King and Zeng (2001) to reestimate the regressions for Table 3 and Table 4 and find that our results are essentially the same. 578,190 (746,113) acquirer ( The effect of industry expertise may not be equally important for all transactions. Over time, firms may be less reliant on banks' expertise after gaining experience from previous transactions. To test this possibility, we add to the advisor choice model (Equation (2)) an interaction term between the industry expertise and a merger experience dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm has engaged in at least one M&A transaction in the past five years, and 0 otherwise. The basic idea is that first timers (firms engaged in their first merger) may value the benefit of industry expertise of advisors more than the firms that have merger experiences. The results in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show that the interaction term is negative and statistically significant for the advisor choice of both acquirers (column 3) and targets (column 4), indicating that firms with merger experience indeed are less dependent on their financial advisors for industry-wide information.
Additionally, we conjecture that the effect of industry expertise on advisor choice is contingent on the nature of deal provisions and on the complexity of the transaction. To test this hypothesis, we estimate the augmented probit model as follows.
where Z is a vector of deal-specific variables that are constant across all firm-bank pairs for each deal (transaction). We interact deal-specific variables with our key variables of interest (Y) to capture the contingent effects.
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Z includes variables that proxy for industry relatedness and deal characteristics. In particular, we employ a horizontal merger dummy to capture the industry relatedness between acquirer and target. A merger is classified as horizontal if the acquirer and target share the same four-digit SIC code. Servaes and Zenner (1996) Expertise is positive and significant in both the acquirer's and the target's advisor choice models.
This finding suggests that for horizontal mergers, firms place a high value on bank's industry expertise, because advisors' industry experience is more relevant for understanding and valuing merger counterparties in the same industry.
In columns 2 and 6, we include an interaction term between a dummy for pure-stock offer and bank's industry merger expertise. Consistent with Hansen's (1987) argument that deals with pure-stock offers are more complex than those with cash offers, both acquirers and targets in pure-stock offers are more likely to employ advisors with industry experience.
In columns 3 and 7, we include an interaction term between a dummy for merger-of- The results in columns 4 and 8 suggest that the presence of termination fee provisions increase the likelihood of both acquirers and targets employing banks with industry merger expertise. Officer (2003) notes that termination fees help reduce the failure risk of an acquisition.
In particular, he argues that target termination fee can be used as devices to "efficiently solve contracting problems between the bidder and the target" by protecting "the deal-related investment made by the bidder". Our findings suggest the existence of a termination fee clause reflects high complexity of a transaction that calls for the need of industry expertise. Finally, the coefficients of control variables in Table 4 are qualitatively the same as those reported in Table 3 .
Taken together, the results in Table 4 suggest that the effect of industry expertise on the advisor choice varies across firms for both acquirers and targets. Firms tend to value banks' industry expertise more for horizontal mergers, as well as in more complicated transactions that require experienced banks to resolve contracting problems between the acquirers and targets. We have also tried to include the interaction terms between our measure of information leakage concerns, Bank-industry rival relationship, and various deal characteristics (Z). Results (untabulated) reveal that the interaction terms are statistically insignificant, implying that the negative effect of information leakage concerns on the advisor choice is insensitive to deal characteristics.
B. Advisor Switching Decisions
Our results so far suggest that bank's industry merger expertise and the concern of information leakage to industry rivals are important determinants of the advisor choice. Further, the effect of industry expertise on the advisor choice is influenced by deal characteristics. We now study the advisor switching behaviour in consecutive transactions for both acquirers and targets. The model for advisor switching is different from the advisor choice model in at least two ways. First, the switching model requires firms in consideration have merger experience and it is conditional on an established bank-firm relationship, while the advisor choice model is an unconditional model. Thus, by construction, firms in the switching model are more experienced in M&As than those in the choice model. Second, it focuses on a particular bank-firm link and tests whether the firm retains the existing advisor or switches to any other banks, while the advisor choice model assumes that a firm chooses among all candidate banks.
To examine the advisor switching decision of a firm from the previous transaction to the current one, we exclude the first M&A transaction for every firm in the sample. This reduces the numbers of observations for acquirers and targets to 2,231 and 920, respectively. The probit model for the switching decision is written as follows.
Prob (firm switches advisor at time t) = f(a
where f is the cumulative normal distribution function, and the dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm chooses a bank for the current deal that is different from the one in the most recent transaction. We define a switch if a firm does not hire advisors from its most recent deal (or, if ex-advisors have been acquired, their successors). If multiple advisors were hired in the previous deal, we define a switch if the firm does not retain every advisor from the previous deal (Asker and Ljungqvist (2010)) 15 . Y kjt includes industry expertise and bankindustry rival relationship. X kjt is a vector of other determinants of the advisor switching decision, which are used by Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) . It includes bank-firm prior relationship, banks' overall market share, a loyalty measure that captures how often the bank retains its clients, and bank-merger dummy indicating whether the previous financial advisor itself has involved in any bank mergers since the previous deal. 16 It also includes the number of years since the previous transaction as a control variable, which is motivated by James (1992) who shows that the value of firm-specific information (in a bank-firm relationship) degrades over time, suggesting the likelihood of a firm switching advisors increases with the time elapsed since the last transaction.
[Insert Table 5 here]
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 report the results obtained from estimating Equation (4) for acquirers and targets, respectively. The coefficient of bank's industry expertise is negative and significant at the 5% level, implying that advisors with merger expertise in the industry are more likely to be retained in future transactions. The economic magnitude is such that a one standard deviation increase in industry expertise (0.098) is associated with a reduction of the probability of 15 The regression is not run on a transaction basis, instead, it is on a firm-bank pair basis. Let us consider an example: A firm hires A, B, and C banks as advisors in the previous deal and the firm only retains bank A as the advisor in the current deal. In switching regression, for the current deal, we actually have 3 observations: firm-bank A, firm-bank B, and firm-bank C. The switching dummy is equal to 0 for firm-bank A, but 1 for firm-bank B and firm-bank C. 16 Loyalty index measures how often an advisor retains its client firms in consecutive M&A deals. Let I ck and I rk = 1 if an advisor j advisor firm k's penultimate and the most recent M&A transactions, respectively, in the past five years, and zero otherwise, then advisor j's loyalty index is set equal to Σ k (I ck × I rk ) / Σ k I ck , which represents the number of retained clients over the total number of clients.
switching by 0.028, which amounts to 5.3% of the unconditional switching probability (0.523).
Furthermore, we find that an acquirer is more likely to switch financial advisors if its former advisor had relationship with top three firms in the industry. An increase in bank-industry rival relationship by one standard deviation (0.027) increases the likelihood of switching by about 14.0% over and above the unconditional probability of switching. These findings confirm the results documented in Table 3 that although firms value advisors' industry expertise, they are also concerned about information leakage to industry rivals.
The results for targets in column 2 of Table 5 , however, suggest that bank's industry expertise and firm's concern about information leakage to industry rivals do not significantly affect the likelihood of target's advisor switching. Experienced targets do not seem to ascribe much importance to bank's industry expertise given that they are already "in play", perhaps The coefficients of other explanatory variables in Table 5 are generally as expected.
Switching is less likely if an advisor has stronger past relationship with the firm, stronger ability to retain clients (higher loyalty index), or larger market share. Consistent with James (1992) , the more time has passed since acquirer's last merger, the more likely that firm will switch advisors for the next transaction.
C. Advisor's Industry Expertise and Advisory Fees
We have documented significant influence of advisor's industry expertise on firms' advisor choice in mergers and acquisitions. In addition, our results also suggest that advisor's merger experience with major industry rivals gives rise to information leakage concerns, which prevent firms from sharing advisors with industry rivals. In this section, we explore the economic implications of bank's industry expertise and information leakage concerns by examining their effects on M&A advisory fees.
By measuring advisor reputation using a binary classification that classifies the top-8 investment banks as top-tier according to the value of deals advised, Golubov, Petmezas, and
Travlos (2012) The dependent variable, advisory fees, is measured as the natural logarithm of advisory fees paid to advisors (McLaughlin (1990 (McLaughlin ( , 1992 ).
17
Note that our empirical analysis is conditional on firms disclosing the information of advisory fees and having non-missing values for variables in fee regressions. Thus the numbers of observations are reduced to 1,652 for acquires and 2,705 for targets. 18 To capture advisor's overall reputation, we follow Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) by including a top-tier advisor dummy, which is equal to one if the advisor is from the top eight investment banks listed in Table 2 , and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we control for a set of explanatory variables that have been shown by previous studies to affect advisory fees (e.g., Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) ). They are the natural logarithm of transaction value, size of transaction relative to the acquirer's market capitalization, and five dummy variables for tender offers, conglomerate mergers, hostile takeovers, mergers involving public targets, and pure cash deals.
[Insert Table 6 here]
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 report the OLS regressions results for advisory fees paid by acquirers and targets, respectively. Consistent with Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), we document that top-tier advisors charge premium fees for their services. More importantly, after controlling for the impact of overall advisor reputation, we find that advisor's industry expertise has a positive and significant impact on fees paid by acquirers (t statistic = 2.1) and targets (tstatistic = 3.5), suggesting that firms value advisor's industry merger expertise and pay a fee premium for it. A one standard deviation increase in industry expertise (0.098) increases the advisory fee by $1.05 million for acquirers ($1.047 million for targets), which is economically significant given that the mean advisory fee is $4.469 million for acquirers ($4.499 million for targets). On the other hand, advisor's prior relationship with industry rivals has a negative effect on advisory fees, implying that firms pay discounted fees to advisors who advised industry rivals to selection issues. In other words, if any hidden factors that determine the disclosure of advisory fees are correlated with the hidden factors that determine the level of fees, an OLS estimation of advisory fees is biased. To tackle this problem, ideally we should use the Heckman's two-stage estimation method, which explicitly models the disclosure of advisory fees in the first stage model and estimate the advisory fee model in the second stage. Unfortunately, it is difficult to find variables explaining the first stage decision -the decision to disclose fees or not in SDC. Our results in Table 6 thus should be interpreted with caution. To the extent that the decision to disclose advisory fees is related to the level of fees, the estimated coefficients in Table 6 can be biased.
because of the concern of information leakage. However, this effect is statistically insignificant (t-statistics = -1.5 and -1.6 for acquirers and targets, respectively).
Not surprisingly, we document that the amount of advisory fees increases with the size of transaction. In addition, firms are found to pay significantly higher fees in tender offers, perhaps reflecting the greater difficulty and longer time taken in completing tender offers. Finally, target's advisory fee is also higher when the target receives cash in acquisitions.
D. Effects of Advisor's Industry Expertise on Deal Completion and Shareholders' Value
Our results so far suggest that advisor's industry expertise is an important factor in advisor choice and firms may a significant fee premium for it. We now explore what benefits firms can gain from hiring advisors with better industry expertise.
Section II outlines two views regarding the impact of advisor' industry expertise on the quality of advisory services. The "value enhancement" view predicts that advisor's industry expertise should be positively associated with shareholder value in acquisitions. In contrast, the "deal completion" view mainly predicts that there should be a positive relation between advisor's industry expertise and the probability of deal completion. While the two hypotheses are not entirely mutually exclusive, we evaluate their relative importance by examining the effects of advisor's industry expertise on various aspects of M&A transactions using regression analysis.
The dependent variables in our regression analysis include three-day [-1, +1] cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the announcement date of acquisitions, the dollar-denominated synergy gain, the acquirer's post-merger stock returns, and the likelihood of deal completion.
19 19 We follow Bates, Lemmon, and Linck (2006) to estimate total US million dollar-denominated synergy as Synergy = acquirer pre-bid MV×acquirer CAR + (1-α) ×target pre-bid MV×target CAR, where pre-bid MV is the firm market value of equity on day -2 relative to the announcement day, CAR is the three-day [-1,+1] cumulative abnormal For independent variables, apart from bank's industry expertise, bank-industry rival relationship, and the top-tier advisor dummy, we include control variables employed in previous studies (e.g., Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) , Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2007) , Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012) ).
The results (untabulated) show that there is no significant effect of advisor's industry expertise on shareholders' value of acquirers and targets. In regressions, neither bank's industry expertise nor bank-industry rival relationship significantly affects CARs, synergies, deal premium, and the acquirer's post-merger stock returns.
20
In contrast, in support of the "deal completion" view, we document that the industry expertise of advisors hired by acquirers is positively associated with the likelihood of deal completion. The results are reported in Table 7 where the dependent variable, deal completion, equals one for completed transactions, and zero for withdrawn deals. Consistent with Golubov, Petmezas, and Travlos (2012), we find that advisor reputation, measured by the top-tier advisor dummy, has no effect on deal completion. While, the industry expertise of advisors hired by acquirers has a positive and significant coefficient (z-statistic = 2.9) in the probit model. The coefficient of bank-industry rival relationship is negative but statistically insignificant (z-statistic = -1.0), indicating that while advisor's relationship with industry rivals heightens the concern of information leakage, it does not impede advisor's capability to complete the deal. As an additional test (untabulated), we include in the regression bank's industry expertise and bankindustry rival relationship for target firms, but find no evidence suggesting that they affect the likelihood of deal completion.
returns and α is the toehold of the acquirer. Post-merger stock returns are defined as three-year buy-and-hold stock returns (BHR) after the effective date minus one. 20 Untabulated results are available from authors upon request.
Finally, we re-examine all the preceding results by augmenting all of the presented models so far by including variables that measure bank industry expertise, bank-industry rival relationship, and bank-firm relationship based on whether a bank provided underwriting services in the five years prior to the merger. It is possible that our proxies for expertise and relationship based on M&A activities may capture expertise and relationship acquired from other corporate finance activities such as securities underwriting. By including relationship measures that capture previous interactions both in the mergers as well as in underwriting, we can demonstrate the degree of uniqueness of exposure between banks and sample firms in M&A activities. Our results (untabulated) show that firms, especially those with limited merger experience, are more likely to choose banks with industry underwriting experiences. More importantly, controlling for all underwriting-based variables, our main results with the merger-based variables are qualitatively unchanged. Further analysis reveals that underwriting-based variables have no significant impact on advisory fees and the probability of completion. These findings suggest that when firms undertake mergers, they ascribe significant value to banks' past expertise in takeovers, which is more relevant than expertise in underwriting activities.
V. Conclusions
This study investigates the impact of advisor's industry expertise and the concern of information leakage to product-market rivals on firm's choice of financial advisors in mergers and acquisitions. We argue that while a bank's experience in mergers is valuable to its clients, its clients are also concerned about potential leakage of information (Calomiris and Singer (2004) and Asker and Ljungavist (2010) ) when the bank conducts businesses with other firms. This paper explores the interactions of those factors and concerns by examining the acquirers' and targets' choices of financial advisors and their decisions to switch advisors between consecutive completed transactions. It also explores the influence of these factors on advisory fee, the probability of deal completion, and other various aspects of M&A transactions.
We find that advisor's industry merger expertise is a strong determinant of the advisor choice, and the effect is stronger when the merger is a horizontal one and when the transaction is more complicated -a transaction involving stock swap, similar sized firms, and a termination fee.
This overall result persists even after controlling for prior relationships with firms and bank's overall market share, and therefore identifies industry expertise as a new factor (previously unidentified in the literature) that significantly affects the choice of advisors in mergers and acquisitions.
Our analysis of advisor choice further shows that firms with merger experience are less concerned with advisors' industry expertise than first timers. However, a bank's industry expertise also heightens its clients' concern about information leakage to product-market rivals and they avoid sharing advisors with their rivals. The finding is confirmed by the investigation of acquirer's and target's advisor switching behavior between consecutive completed transactions.
In particular, acquirers are more likely to switch away from advisors who have relationships with major industry rivals. Finally, both acquirers and targets pay higher fees if their advisors have better industry expertise. The higher fees probably reflect the banks' ability to leverage their industry expertise to complete M&A deals. Our analysis on the probability of deal completion confirms our prediction. However, we find no evidence indicating that advisor's industry merger expertise is associated with value creation for target and acquiring firms.
Our analysis offers interesting insights into the effects of industry expertise and information leakage concerns, deal complexity on the choice of financial advisors. Our findings represent important advances in understanding the causes of choosing merger advisors from the perspectives view points of acquirers and targets and add to the overall understanding of the roles played by investment banks in mergers. . Transaction value is in US$ billion. Column (1) reports the total value of all mergers advised by the bank and its predecessors. Column (3) reports the total number of all mergers advised by the bank and its predecessors. Column (2) reports the total transaction value of an advisor as a percentage of total transaction values of all advisors. Column (4) reports the total number of transactions advised by a bank as a percentage of the total number of deals done by all advisors. If there is more than one bank advising the acquirer/target in a transaction, each participating bank will get 1/n share of deal value or 1/n of the count, where n is the number of advisers. Bidders' and targets' advisors are counted separately. Therefore, if both the acquirer and the target of a transaction use advisors, the total number of counts is two for the transaction. Table 3 . Heteroskedasticity-consistent z-statistics, which are clustered at the deal level, are shown in parentheses. We use ***, **, and * to denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Panel A: Acquirer's advisor choice Panel B: Target's advisor choice 
